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Abstract
This paper examines the associations between obesity, employment status and
wages for several European countries. Our results provide weak evidence that
obese workers are more likely to be unemployed or tend to be more segregated in
self-employment jobs than their non-obese counterparts. We also ￿nd di¢ cult to
detect statistically signi￿cant relationships between obesity and wages. As previ-
ously reported in the literature, the associations between obesity, unemployment
and wages seem to be di⁄erent for men and women. Moreover, heterogeneity
is also found across countries. Such heterogeneity can be somewhat explained
by some labor market institutions, such as collective bargaining coverage and
employer-provided health insurance.
JEL Classi￿cation: J3, I1.
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11 Introduction
It is a well-known fact that obesity is one of the most important public health concerns:
obesity is a risk factor for numerous health problems and many chronic diseases (WHO,
2002), and its prevalence has increased by 10-40% in most European countries over the
last decade (WHO, 2003).1 Moreover, obesity a⁄ects not only adults but also teenagers
and children, especially in southern Europe (IOTF, 2002, 2003). For all these reasons, it
is important to assess both the determinants and the consequences of obesity (Philipson,
2001).
The e⁄ects of obesity on labor market outcomes for the US have been assessed in a
large number of studies.2 One of their most robust ￿ndings is that obese women tend to
earn less than their non-obese counterparts and that there are di⁄erences by ethnicity
and/or race (Cawley, 2007). However, the available empirical evidence for Europe is
more limited. On the one hand, there are some studies for particular European countries:
UK (Sargent & Blanch￿ ower, 1994; Morris 2005, 2006), Finland (Sarlio-Lahteenkorva
& Lahelma, 1999), Germany (Cawley, Grabka, & Lillard, 2005), and Denmark (Greve,
2005). In the work by Sargent & Blanch￿ ower (1994), hourly earnings of women at age
23 are found to be lower conditioned on being obese at age 16, but no such a relation is
found for men. More recently, Morris (2005, 2006) shows that body mass index (BMI)
has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on mean hourly occupational earning in males and
a negative and signi￿cant e⁄ect in females, although the association for males is not
robust across di⁄erent speci￿cations. However, after using the mean BMI (and/or the
prevalence of obesity) across individuals living in the same health authority area as an
instrument for individual BMI, he ￿nds no statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect, either for men
or for women. In Finland, obese females are found to have lower income levels than
non-obese ones, but that is not the case for males (Sarlio-Lahteenkorva & Lahelma,
1999). The empirical evidence for Germany shows that obesity is negatively associated
with wages, both for men and for women (Cawley, Grabka, & Lillard, 2005). Moreover,
1Overweight and obesity are usually de￿ned by means of the Body Mass Index (BMI), which is
de￿ned as the individual￿ s body weight (in kilograms) divided by the square of the height (in square
meters). According to the WHO, overweight is de￿ned as 25 6 BMI < 30, and obesity is de￿ned as
BMI > 30.
2See, for example, Register & Williams (1980), Hamermesh & Biddle (1994), Averett & Korenman
(1996), PagÆn & DÆvila (1997), Cawley (2000, 2004), Behrman & Rosenzweig (2001), Saporta & Halpern
(2002), Baum & Ford (2004), and Conley & Glauber (2005, 2007).
2using genetics as a natural experiment, the authors cannot reject the hypothesis of no
causal impact of weight on wages. Finally, preliminary evidence for Denmark shows
a negative e⁄ect of obesity and overweight on employment for women, while for men
overweight seems to have a positive e⁄ect on employment (Greve, 2005).3
On the other hand, there are some studies for Europe as a whole, using the Eu-
ropean Community Household Panel (ECHP), the dataset used in the present article.
d￿ Hombres & Brunello (2005) analyze the e⁄ect of BMI on wages in Europe. Pooling
all the countries together, they ￿nd that the association between BMI and wages is
negative for women, and positive for men. Using BMI from biological family members
as an instrument for individual BMI, they report a negative e⁄ect of BMI for both
men and women. However, as these authors recognize, assuming a common relationship
between obesity and wages across di⁄erent European countries is too restrictive, given
the di⁄erent characteristics in labor markets across such countries. They distinguish
between two groups of countries: ￿olive belt￿(Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), and
￿beer belt￿(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Ireland). According to their IV
estimates, the sign of the relationship between BMI and wages depends on the group of
countries: BMI has a positive e⁄ect on wages for both men and women in the ￿beer-belt￿
countries, while this e⁄ect is negative in the ￿olive-belt￿countries. They argue that one
plausible explanation for such a ￿nding is the interaction between BMI and weather:
the ￿olive-belt￿countries have warmer weather, while those belonging to the ￿beer belt￿
have colder weather. From a human capital point of view, investment in body size can
be seen as a way of enhancing productivity in colder places. This argument might be
reasonable in a rural-farm economy, but we do not consider it is appropriate in the case
of developed European countries. Moreover, the fact that di⁄erent BMI-wage relation-
ships are found for each of these two groups is a strong reason to allow each relationship
to be di⁄erent across countries.
Sousa (2005) applies the propensity score technique (matching estimator) in order
to assess the causal e⁄ect of BMI on labor market outcomes in Europe using the ECHP.
Pooling all the countries together, she ￿nds that the average treatment e⁄ect for those
having a BMI above 25 decreases labor force participation for women, but it increases
male labor force participation. Moreover, when she allows for di⁄erent average treat-
3These e⁄ects are estimated using whether or not the individual￿ s parents have ever taken medication
related to obesity (or obesity related diseases) and their mortality status as instruments for individual
BMI.
3ment e⁄ects in Northern and Southern countries, her qualitative results are the same.
However, the average treatment e⁄ect is not estimated for each country separately.
Finally, there is a recent study by Lundborg, Bolin, H￿jg￿rd & Lindgren (2007)
using the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), where the
authors analyze the e⁄ect of obesity on employment, hours worked and hourly wages in
10 European countries for people aged 50 and above. Pooling all the countries, they ￿nd
that obesity is negatively associated with being employed for both men and women and
with female hourly wages. Moreover, their results by country-group (Nordic, Central
and Southern) suggest that the e⁄ects of obesity on labor market outcomes di⁄er across
Europe.
Unfortunately, none of these studies provide a fully comparable country-by-country
European analysis, which seems necessary according to the empirical evidence in d￿ Hombres
& Brunello (2005) and Lundborg et al. (2007). Thus, the main purpose of the present
work is to provide empirical estimates of the associations between body size variables
and labor market outcomes in a large number of European countries, without restricting
all associations to be equal across countries or groups of countries. As far as we know,
none of the existent studies has analyzed the correlations between body size and the
labor market status: employee, self-employment and unemployed. Additionally, we go
one step further providing some evidence on the potential role played by labor market
institutions and cultural factors in explaining these associations. It is important to men-
tion that we do not aim to provide a causal analysis, but we are interested in o⁄ering
just a description, as accurate as possible, of the relationship between body size and
labor market outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the issues of correlation and
causality when interested in the relation between body size and labor market outcomes.
In Section 3, we present the dataset, the variables used and our main results. Section
4 includes a ￿rst exploration of the role played by di⁄erent cultural and labor market
institutions on the association between obesity and labor market outcomes. Finally,
Section 5 concludes with suggested possible avenues for further research.
42 Body Size and Labor Market Outcomes: Correla-
tion and Causality
As mentioned in the previous section, the purpose of this paper is not to identify the
causal e⁄ect of body size on labor market outcomes, since this is a challenging task
without a credible quasi-experiment or experimental data. Rather we aim to provide a
descriptive analysis. As emphasized by Cawley (2007), the associations between body
size and labor market outcomes can re￿ ect three possible relations: the e⁄ect of obe-
sity on labor market outcomes (discrimination and/or productivity), the e⁄ect of labor
market outcomes on obesity (see Morland, Wing, Roux, & Poole, 2002), and the e⁄ect
of a third factor on both obesity and labor market outcomes (for example, individual
time preference).
To disentangle causality from correlation in the relationship between body size and
labor market outcomes, several empirical strategies have been used: lagged measures of
the BMI (see, e.g., Conley & Glauber, 2005, 2007), ￿xed-e⁄ects strategies (e.g., indi-
vidual di⁄erences like in Averett & Korenman, 1996, or using monozygotic twins, see
Behrman & Rosenzweig, 2001), instrumental variables (e.g., genetic variation, like in
Cawley 2000, 2004, or in d￿ Hombres & Brunello, 2005; obesity medication taken by
parents or their mortality status, in Greve, 2005; average BMI (and prevalence of obe-
sity) across individuals living in the same health authority area, in Morris, 2005, 2006;
the presence of other obese persons in the household, being an oldest child, and having
sisters only, in Lundborg et al. 2007), and propensity score (Sousa, 2005). However, all
these identi￿cation strategies are somewhat disappointing, since the assumptions they
rely on are very strong.
First, in the lagged speci￿cation strategy, the independence of the lagged BMI vari-
able on the residual term is required, which is very unlikely to be true, because the
error term is likely to capture some omitted variable related to both past BMI and the
contemporaneous labor market outcome of interest (e.g., through self-esteem).
Second, ￿xed-e⁄ects strategies require the regressors to be strictly exogenous and
that all the omitted relevant and unobserved individual characteristics remain constant
over time. BMI￿ s strict exogeneity is de￿ned as BMI being uncorrelated with the error
term for all leads and lags, which is highly implausible when using individual ￿xed-
e⁄ects, since the lagged BMI measure might be correlated with the contemporaneous
error term (see the explanation above in the lagged strategy case). Furthermore, the
5individual ￿xed-e⁄ects strategy involves a particular implicit trade-o⁄between precision
and consistency. The shorter the time period, the lower the probability that unobserved
individual di⁄erences arise over time, which is favorable to the assumption of ￿xed
di⁄erences across individuals. However, the shorter the period of time, the higher the
imprecision of the estimated e⁄ect. In the limit, there is no change at all, and such
estimation is not possible. On the contrary, the longer the time period, the higher the
precision of our estimates, but then it is also unlikely that an individual ￿xed e⁄ect
is capturing all the relevant omitted variables. Hence, our estimates are likely to be
inconsistent. Moreover, there is no a priori argument why we should prefer imprecision
to inconsistency (Deaton, 1997), as it can be easily seen from the previous extreme case.
Even in the hypothetical case that these assumptions were satis￿ed, reverse causality
could not be discarded, which is likely to be an issue in this context (Morland et al.,
2002).
Third, when using instrumental variables techniques, the usual relevance and exo-
geneity conditions are required (Wooldridge, 2001). In Cawley (2000), the weight of
a child is used as an instrument for the weight of the child￿ s mother. At ￿rst glance
one may think this constitutes a valid instrument, a source of exogenous variation in
weight due to genetics. However, if for instance the genetic component of the child
associated with weight is also related to other factors regarding employment and wage
of the mother, this kind of instrument does not satisfy the exogeneity condition. Re-
cently, Cawley (2004) has used sibling weight adjusted for sex and age to instrument
individual weight, justifying again the exogeneity of such instrument on the grounds of
genetic variation. The problem is that, as recognized by Cawley (2004, 2007), there
exists the possibility that a substantial part of the genes responsible for obesity are also
responsible for other factors that a⁄ect labor market outcomes, such as willingness to
delay grati￿cation (time discount rate) or other kind of unobserved characteristic. Since
the current knowledge on which particular genes are responsible for obesity and other
factors related with wages and employment is scarce, we doubt the validity of these
instruments.4
4We also doubt the validity of the instruments for BMI that have been suggested recently. Morris
(2005, 2006) uses mean BMI (and/or prevalence of obesity) across individuals living in the same health
authority area. His identi￿cation strategy is ￿ awed because of the potential existence of non-random
sorting in health authorities where individuals live (depending on unobservable factors related to obesity
and occupational attainment). Greve (2005) uses whether or not the individual￿ s parents have ever taken
medication related to obesity (or obesity related diseases) and their mortality status. It is di¢ cult to
6It might be the case that for this reason, Sousa (2005) decides to use a propensity
score approach. Using the propensity score, she creates similar groups of people based
on observable characteristics, and it provides consistent estimates under the assumption
that those groups, which are constructed to be similar in observable characteristics, are
also similar in their unobservable characteristics. However, this method requires a large
number of observations to be able to construct enough groups of individuals based on
their observable characteristics, and the required sample size will be higher, the higher
the number of covariates used in the construction of such groups. Indeed, Sousa (2005)
faces a problem of small sample size because of the relative low number of observations in
the ECHP compared to other micro databases. This forces her to pool all the countries
together (or at most to estimate the e⁄ect of body size for only 2 groups of countries: a
subsample of Northern and a subsample of Southern countries), restricting the estimated
average treatment e⁄ect on the treated (those with a BMI above 25) to be the same
in each country (or in each group of countries). The problem of estimating an average
treatment e⁄ect on the treated (ATT) for Europe as a whole (or only for Southern and
Northern European countries) is twofold. First, if the ATT di⁄ers across countries, the
estimated ATT cannot be informative for a particular country. Second, even if we are
interested in an average ATT for Europe as a whole, we should properly weigh each
country￿ s speci￿c ATT.
In this paper we focus on two main labor market outcomes: employment status in the
labor market and hourly wage.5 First, we are concerned with the relationship between
body size and labor market status, because it is likely to provide direct and understand-
able signs on the existence of discrimination in the labor market. For this reason, instead
of estimating the probability of being employed versus being unemployed, we propose
a multinomial logit with the following outcomes: employee, self-employed and unem-
ployed. There are two justi￿cations for such an approach. First, this speci￿cation is
logical from a timing point of view: these outcomes are observable conditioned on partic-
ipating in the labor force, a condition clearly violated by a speci￿cation of the employed-
versus-unemployed/inactive type. Second, and more important, this econometric model
believe that such instruments are not related to unobservable factors a⁄ecting both BMI and labor
market outcomes, such as children depression in the case of the later, or parental investments in the
former. Lundborg et al. (2007) recognize some of the problems of the instruments they use in their
paper.
5We do not present associations between obesity and labor force participation because of the strong
reverse causality. These results are available from the authors upon request.
7sheds more light on the existence of discrimination. Under physical discrimination in
the hiring process, we should expect to ￿nd not only that unemployed people are more
likely to be obese than those who are employed, but also that self-employed tend to
be more obese than employed. Secondly, we are interested in the relationship between
body size and wages. If, after controlling for observable characteristics determining
wages, we ￿nd wage di⁄erentials between obese and non-obese workers, this will be a
sign of the potential existence of discrimination in the labor market, although obviously
not conclusive, in the sense that we are not dealing with BMI￿ s endogeneity.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Dataset
The data used in this paper come from the ECHP, Eurostat, a survey based on a
standardized questionnaire that involves annual interviewing of a representative panel
of households and individuals in Member States of the European Union during the period
1994-2001. The ECHP annually interviews of a representative panel of households and
individuals in each country, covering a wide range of topics on living conditions. The
ECHP￿ s standardized methodology and procedures yield comparable information across
countries.
We only use the ECHP waves since 1998 (￿fth wave), because this was the ￿rst time
in which anthropometric data were collected. Moreover, in our analysis we only include
countries with a full ECHP data format and those in which anthropometric data were
collected: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland (starting in 1999), Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, and Spain.6
We focus on two main labor market outcomes: the employment status in the labor
market and the hourly wage. The employment status is de￿ned as a categorical variable
with possible states reported by the individual: (1) working more than 15 hours per
week for an employer in a paid employment, paid apprenticeship or under other related
schemes; (2) working more than 15 hours in self-employment or in a family enterprise
(unpaid work); (3) unemployed. Individuals working less than 15 hours represented a
0.5% of the sample and were dropped from the analysis. The wage variable is de￿ned as
6For more detailed information on the ECHP, visit EuroPanel Users Network at
http://epunet.essex.ac.uk
8the natural logarithm of the hourly wage. The hourly wage is constructed by dividing
the variable ￿net monthly wage and salary earnings￿by the number of monthly hours
(including paid overtime) worked in the main job, which are computed approximately
as four times the number of weekly hours (including paid overtime) worked in the main
job.
We estimate di⁄erent models for each country, allowing for a ￿ exible econometric
speci￿cation, in the sense that none of the coe¢ cients are restricted to be the same
across countries. Moreover, the models are estimated for men and women separately.
To estimate the associations between labor market status and body size, a multino-
mial logit model is speci￿ed. The associations between wages and the alternative body
size measures are estimated through standard ordinary least squares.
Three di⁄erent measures of body size are used in this paper: 1) BMI (weight in
kilograms divided by height in meters squared); 2) weight in kilograms (controlling for
height in centimeters); and 3) an indicator for being obese (controlling for the rest of
BMI categories).7 All these variables are constructed using self-reported height and
weight measures. An important point is that we are going to focus on the speci￿cation
containing BMI categories, and we will devote our attention to the obesity indicator.
This decision is based on two main advantages of such an approach. First, given that
a non-monotonic relationship between body size and labor market outcomes cannot
be discarded on a priori grounds (see the empirical evidence in Saporta & Halpern,
2002), the BMI dummies approach o⁄ers a ￿ exible and straightforward procedure for
addressing this issue. Second, since the main purpose of the paper is to estimate the
association between obesity and labor market outcomes, this body size variable is the
one we are more interested in.
Apart from the body size variable, both the participation and labor market status
equations include the following covariates: age, age squared, two dummies indicating
the highest completed education level, household income once individual earnings are
discounted (which is adjusted to equivalent units using the OECD conversion scale and
standardized at the country level), country dummies, year dummies, and the interactions
between country and year dummies. To take account of the relationship between chil-
dren, female labor supply, and pregnancy related weight gains, the employment equation
includes one dummy for being married, the number of children below 14 in the house-
7The standard BMI classi￿cation is the following: below 18.5 is underweight, between 18.5 and 25
is healthy (normal), between 25 and 30 is overweight and 30 and above is obese.
9hold, and the number of children between 14 and 15 in the household. Nevertheless,
these controls have been added to the male equations as well for comparability purposes.
We estimate standard wage equations which include: age, age squared, two dummies
indicating the highest completed education level, experience (de￿ned as the correspond-
ing ECHP wave minus the age at which the individual had her ￿rst job), experience
squared, and tenure (number of years in the current job), country e⁄ects, year e⁄ects
and interactions between year and country e⁄ects.
Finally, we decided to control for interview e⁄ects, adding an indicator whether
the year of the interview di⁄ers from the one regarding the information being asked,
quarter of interview dummies, and an indicator whether the mode of interviewing was
face-to-face. All these interview controls are assumed to have common e⁄ects across
countries.
The sample is restricted to people between 25 and 54, the demographic group with
the highest employment rate. The appendix contains a table with the basic descriptive
statistics for each country.
ECHP personal weights are used in all estimations described in this paper. The
standard error for each reported coe¢ cient is robust to heteroskedasticity and calculated
with clustering by individual to account for correlations in the error terms of each
individual over time.
3.2 Estimated Associations
In this subsection we present the empirical results. In Tables 1A and 1B we report the
estimated associations between employment status and obesity obtained from the esti-
mation of the multinomial logit model. For the three body size measures, the reported
associations are presented in terms of Relative Risk Ratios (RRRs) between the proba-
bility of working as a self-employed (Table 1A) and the probability of being unemployed
(Table 1B) both with respect to the probability of working as an employee.
As we can see in Table 1A, in seven out of nine countries, the RRRs for women are
higher than one, which means that obese women tend to be more self-employed rather
than working as employees. However, only in three out of nine cases are the RRRs
statistically signi￿cant, ranging from approximately 1.6 in both countries Greece and
Italy to 2.1 in Ireland. Roughly speaking, obese Greek and Italian women have a 50%
higher probability of working as self-employed workers rather than as employees, while
10in Ireland, obese women tend to be two times more concentrated in self-employment
rather than working as employees. For men, similar results arise, ￿nding statistically
signi￿cant RRRs higher than 1 in Greece (1.6), Ireland (1.8) and Spain (1.4).
Some caution must be taken when interpreting these results. On the one hand, we
￿nd six out of eighteen coe¢ cients (counting both men and women) to be statistically
signi￿cant, which means 1/3 of the estimated coe¢ cients appear to be statistically sig-
ni￿cant. Furthermore, taking into account that we are looking at the e⁄ects of obesity on
labor market status across several countries, the probability of rejecting non-signi￿cance
of a particular coe¢ cient when in fact this coe¢ cient is not signi￿cant is very high. This
means that even by chance we may ￿nd statistically signi￿cant associations. In order
to address this issue, p-values are adjusted using Bonferroni￿ s method for multiple test-
ing.8 On the other hand, the relationship between body size and labor market status,
although it may capture the e⁄ect of discrimination against obese people in the hiring
process, more importantly it is likely to re￿ ect reverse causality from labor market status
(employee, self-employed, or unemployed) to obesity, or some type of selection or sorting
in employment versus self-employment. If we are willing to assume that an important
channel through which reverse causality and selection occur is through health problems,
a crude way to address these concerns is using a sample readjustment. The idea is to
exclude people who declare being hampered by any kind of physical or mental disability
a⁄ecting their daily life activities and trimming some observations falling outside the
[15, 45] BMI interval (88 and 55 for women and men respectively). After performing this
crude sample readjustment, we ￿nd that obesity is statistically signi￿cantly associated
with a higher relative probability of being self-employed with respect to being an em-
ployee in four and two out of nine cases for women and men respectively. However, once
we compute the Bonferroni￿ s adjusted p-values for the new sample, we ￿nd no statisti-
cally signi￿cant associations for women, and only one signi￿cant association is found for
men: in Greece, obese men are found to be 70% more likely to be self-employed rather
than being employees with respect to non-obese.
Overall, there is weak evidence that obese workers tend to be more segregated in self-
employment than the non-obese ones. According to our results, there is no evidence on
8The idea behind the Bonferroni￿ s adjustment is to minimize the probability of making a Type-I
error. Although it is a conservative procedure, it is use is justi￿ed on two key grounds: 1) we have no
a priori well-de￿ned hypothesis on how these associations should di⁄er across countries; and 2) we are
searching for associations without pre-established hypotheses.
11discrimination against obese in terms of being relatively more likely to be self-employed
workers rather than employees, neither for men nor for women.
[Insert Table 1A about here]
When analyzing the ratio between the probability of being unemployed with respect
to the probability of working as an employee, Table 1B seems to suggest very di⁄erent
results for women and men: obesity seems to be associated with a higher relative prob-
ability of being unemployed in all countries but Denmark for the former, while for the
later, in six out of nine countries, we ￿nd the opposite result: obesity is associated with
a lower relative probability of being unemployed. However, statistical signi￿cant asso-
ciations are found in only four countries: Belgium, 2.2 for women, 3.1 for men; Finland,
0.5 for men; Italy, 1.7 for women; and Spain, 1.9 for women.
Applying the same logic as in the analysis of Table 1A, once we exclude hampered
people and potential outliers, statistically signi￿cant associations remain in Belgium
(2.2 for women, 3.3 for men), and in Spain (1.7 for women). Moreover, the relationship
in Belgium is robust to adjusted p-values for both men and women: obese women in
Belgium are more than twice likely to be unemployed rather than working as employees,
and for men this ratio is even higher, more than three times. As in the previous analysis,
if anything, there is weak evidence that obese workers are more likely to be unemployed
rather than their non-obese counterparts.
[Insert Table 1B about here]
Finally, Table 2 presents the correlations between log of hourly wages and body size
measures. For women, all such correlations are negative in all countries, except for the
case of Ireland, where the correlation between the log of hourly wage and weight is zero.
Something similar happens for men with the two continuous body size measures (BMI
and weight), but the correlation goes in the opposite direction: all such correlations
are positive. Nevertheless, once we focus on obesity, the results for men are mixed.
However, emphasis must be put on statistically signi￿cant associations. In the case of
obesity, these are found in Denmark, Finland and Portugal. On one hand, obese Danish
female workers tend to earn a 9% lower hourly wage than their non-obese counterparts.
In Finland and Portugal the female obesity wage gaps are 10% and 7%. On the other
12hand, we only ￿nd a signi￿cant relationship in the case of men: obese Belgian employees
tend to earn a higher hourly wage (8%) than their non-obese counterparts. It is worth
noting that we detected that 16 observations (those falling outside of the [15, 45] BMI
interval) from the initial sample of employees were responsible for the statistical negative
association for women in Portugal. Given the potential sensibility of our estimates to
outliers, we decided to trim the data outside the [15, 45] BMI interval, as we did previ-
ously in the labor market status equations. Moreover, we check the robustness of such
associations estimating the following augmented speci￿cations: (1) adding occupational
dummies and ￿rm size, (2) adding occupational dummies, ￿rm size, and self-reported
health status dummies, and (3) adding occupational dummies, ￿rm size, self-reported
health status dummies and excluding hampered people.9 In two countries, we ￿nd ro-
bust statistically signi￿cant correlations for all 4 speci￿cations. In the speci￿cation (3)
obese Danish women employees are found to earn a 7% lower wage than their non-obese
counterparts. In Belgium, obese men tend to earn higher wages than non-obese ones.
Nevertheless, none of these associations are statistically signi￿cant once the p-values are
adjusted for multiple testing.
In summary, our results indicate that it is di¢ cult to detect statistically signi￿cant
associations between wages and obesity, both for men and for women.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Comparing our results to those in d￿ Hombres and Brunello (2005), and bearing in
mind that both their sample and estimation strategy di⁄er from ours (they include
people between 18 and 65 and they use IV), we do not ￿nd that BMI and wages are
positively associated in "beer-belt" countries and negatively in "olive-belt" ones. Nev-
ertheless, they do not report the OLS estimations when allowing for di⁄erences between
"olive-belt" and "beer-belt" countries.10
9There are 9 occupational categories: Legislators, senior o¢ cials and managers; Professionals; Tech-
nicians and associate professionals; Clerks; Service workers and shop and market sales workers; Skilled
agricultural and ￿shery workers; Craft and related trade workers; Plant and machine operators and
assemblers; and Elementary occupations. Firm size is a variable taking value 0 if there is none regular
paid employees in the local unit in the current job, 2.5 if 1-4, 12 if 5-19, 34.5 if 20-49, 74.5 if 50-99,
299.5 if 100-499 and 500 if 500 or more. Self-reported health status categories are very good, good,
fair, bad and very bad.
10We also estimated several models for both the two groups of countries separately and pooled, and
we did not ￿nd their associations.
13To ￿nish this section, we would like to mention some shortcomings regarding our
empirical analysis. First of all, the body size measures used in this study are self-
reported, which means that they are potentially measured with error. In fact, there
is evidence showing that this measurement error is not random, and the direction of
the bias, and its extent, vary systematically with age and sex (Thomas & Frankenberg,
2000). However, their results also show there is little variation in the bias with age from
ages 25 to 54, which might possibly also be true for European data. Moreover, since
we are estimating equations for men and women separately, the sex bias variation is
not a concern. Second, special attention should be devoted to the estimated wage-body
size correlations from the augmented speci￿cations. When controlling for occupational
dummies and ￿rm size, we should realize that this is only a crude control for taking
into account unobserved individual di⁄erences associated with jobs and wages. So it
is necessary to keep in mind that we are incurring into a bias due to sample selection,
provided that there exists non-random sorting into di⁄erent occupations and/or small
versus large ￿rms. For example, it might be the case that obese workers were more
likely to be hired by small ￿rms and/or in speci￿c occupations, and hence, once we
control for these endogenous variables, we do not ￿nd an e⁄ect of body size on wage.
Similar problems arise when controlling for health status. Third, it should be noted
that there are potential selection issues in both labor market status and wage equations.
However, since standard selectivity corrections techniques depend on speci￿c functional
form assumptions and the exogeneity of the variables of the selection equation, we think
this approach would add noise to our descriptive analysis.
4 The role of cultural factors and labor market in-
stitutions
Cawley (2007) formulates an interesting research question on the relationship between
obesity and wages: Is there a universal pattern across countries or does it vary with
culture and labor market institutions? The empirical evidence in d￿ Hombres & Brunello
(2005) and Lundborg et al. (2007), discussed before, suggests that culture and labor
market institutions may be relevant for understanding the associations between obesity
and wages. In this section, we take a ￿rst look at the role played by di⁄erent cultural and
labor market factors on the associations between obesity and labor market outcomes.
14Nevertheless, we should be aware of the exploratory character of such analysis, since we
have only nine data points, and hence any possible explanation based on such evidence
has, at most, a tentative character.
On the labor market institutions side, existing empirical evidence shows that unions
reduce wage inequality and that this compression e⁄ect is strongest in countries where
union membership and bargaining coverage are high, and bargaining is centralized
and/or coordinated (Blau & Kahn, 1999). There is also some evidence that the de-
gree of collective bargaining coverage (CBC) is positively associated with the relative
wage of youths, older workers and women (OECD, 2004). This may also be the case
for obese workers. For this reason, we focus on CBC rate (the number of employees
covered by a collective agreement over the total number of employees).11 Our working
hypothesis is that the collective bargaining coverage rated, which seems to have a pos-
itive e⁄ect on the relative wages of youths, older and women, tends to reduce also the
obesity wage ￿penalty￿ . However, if ￿rms are constrained in their abilities to adjust
wages due to CBC, then an undesired e⁄ect might emerge through an increase of the
obesity ￿penalties￿in the hiring process. Hence, we might expect to ￿nd two e⁄ects
from higher CBC: 1) a lower obesity wage ￿penalty￿ ; and/or 2) a lower probability of
being hired (or more exactly, a higher relative probability of being unemployed with
respect to being an employee) for obese workers.
Another labor market institution which might be relevant for the association between
obesity and labor market outcomes is the percentage of employees receiving health care
or medical insurance paid or subsidized by the employer.12 Bhattacharya & Kate Bun-
dorf (2005) ￿nd evidence that obese workers earn lower wages than non-obese workers
because the cost to employers of providing health insurance for obese workers is higher.
However, there might be also a negative e⁄ect in the hiring process of obese workers.
If employers are limited in their ability to pay lower wages to obese workers, because
of the existence of collective agreements, then we might expect to ￿nd that ￿rms tend
to hire less obese workers. Thus, once again, we might expect to ￿nd two e⁄ects from
higher employer provided health care (or medical insurance) rates: 1) a higher obesity
11The collective bargaining coverage data come from Employment Outlook OECD (1997), chapter 3.
The collective bargaining coverage rates used in the subsequent empirical analysis refer to 1994, except
in Finland (1995), Italy (1993) and Portugal (1993).
12We compute the rate of health insurance provided by employers to female and male workers in
each country using the information in the ECHP, where individuals are asked about whether medical
insurance or health care is provided by the employer (free or subsidized).
15wage ￿penalty￿ ; and/or 2) a lower probability of being hired (or more exactly, a higher
relative probability of being unemployed with respect to being an employee) for obese
workers.
On the cultural factors side, we would like to present some evidence on the relation-
ship between stronger cultural norms for thin body types and discrimination against
obese people, in terms of both, hiring and payment in the labor market. Measuring
cultural factors in a quantitative fashion is always a challenging task. However, we
propose the use of two proxies for cultural norms regarding the acceptability of obesity:
prevalence of obesity and the degree of social interactions.
Under the assumption that cultural norms for thin body types are inversely related
to the obesity prevalence in a society, its prevalence can be thought of as being a crude
indicator for the social degree of acceptance of obesity in that country. Our working
hypothesis is that in societies with high obesity rates, we should expect to ￿nd low labor
market penalties associated to obesity.
We de￿ne the degree of social interactions as how often individuals meet friends or
relatives not living with them (Costa-Font & Gil, 2004).13 However, we use this at the
country level, as a crude measure for the intensity of a country￿ s social life. Hence,
it seems intuitive to think of countries where individuals meet friends more frequently
as those countries where social interactions are also more important. If we are willing
to assume that body size concerns are more important in countries with more social
interactions, and the ability to interact with people is valued in the labor market, we
should expect to ￿nd higher labor market penalties for obese people in countries with
higher levels of social interactions.
Figure 1, in the appendix, contains 8 graphs illustrating the relationship between
labor market institutions and obesity labor market outcomes for females and males
separately. Obesity labor market outcomes are the estimated coe¢ cients from column
(3) in Table 1B and Table 2.14 Two interesting results arise from the graphs presented
in Figure 1.
13This variable is constructed using the question ￿How often do you meet friends or relatives not
living with you, whether here at home or elsewhere?￿and re-codifying the answers to (5) On most days,
(4) Once or twice a week, (3) Once or twice a month, (2) Less often than once a month, and (1) Never.
14We do not report the associations for the estimated coe¢ cients from Table 1A because any asso-
ciation between self-employment in di⁄erent European countries and labor market institutions is very
likely to be contaminated by di⁄erences in the regulatory system for starting own businesses across
countries. However, these results are available from the authors upon request.
16First, according to Graph 1.1, for women there is a positive association, albeit weak,
between CBC and the probability of being unemployed with respect to being an em-
ployee, but Graph 1.2 shows no clear relationship for men. Moreover, once we look at
the associations between CBC and the obesity wage gaps for women and men in Graph
1.3 and Graph 1.4 respectively, we ￿nd a strong positive association for women and
no clear relationship for men. For women, these results tend to be consistent with our
previous hypothesis: the higher the CBC, the lower the ability by the ￿rm to penalize
obese female workers in terms of wages, so the ￿rm applies this penalization through
the hiring process. For men, no clear conclusion can be drawn.
Second, graphs 1.5 and 1.6 illustrate respectively two opposite strong signed associ-
ations -once we do not consider the two in￿ uential observations, Ireland in the case of
women, and Belgium in the case of men- between employer-provided health care and
the probability of being unemployed with respect to being an employee. In terms of
wages (Graph 1.7 and Graph 1.8), no clear relationship emerges either for women or
men. Once again, for women, these results seem to be to some extent consistent with
our previous hypothesis: the higher the employer-provided health care, the higher the
penalization through the hiring process, since ￿rms tend to incorporate in their hiring
decisions the higher expected health care costs associated to obese workers. For men,
the opposite striking result is drawn in Graph 1.6: the higher the employer-provided
health care, the lower the penalization through the hiring process. Unfortunately, we
do not have a satisfactory explanation for such a result.
Overall, the reported evidence suggests that labor market institutions can have un-
intended negative and positive e⁄ects for obese female workers: negative in terms of
￿nding a job, positive in terms of increasing their relative wages.
The appendix also contains Figure 2, which presents 8 graphs illustrating the rela-
tionship between cultural factors and obesity labor market outcomes for men and women
separately. As we explained before, two indicators for cultural factors have been de￿ned:
prevalence of obesity and social interactions.
The results regarding the prevalence of obesity and obesity labor market outcomes
are shown in graphs 2.1-2.4. The prevalence of obesity is negatively associated with
the relative probability of being unemployed for both men (excluding the in￿ uential
observation of Belgium) and women, which is in favor of our hypothesis about the
social acceptability of obesity: the higher the prevalence of obesity, the higher the social
acceptability of it, and hence the lower the penalties for obese people in the society,
17and in particular in the labor market. Nevertheless, Graph 2.3 shows that a higher
prevalence of obesity is associated with a higher wage penalty for obese female workers.
This does not need to be inconsistent with our previous hypothesis, if one is willing to
assume the existence of negative spillovers: the higher the prevalence of obesity among
workers, the lower the productivity of a ￿rm. For obese male workers, the higher the
prevalence of obesity, the higher their wage premium. However, we do not want to push
this interpretation too much.
Finally, graphs from 2.5 to 2.8 present the associations between labor market out-
comes and a crude indicator of social interactions (frequency of meetings with friends
and relatives, see footnote 13). On one hand, looking at graphs 2.5 and 2.7, it seems
to be the case that no clear relation is observed for women. On the other hand, we
can realize that, for obese males, the probability of being unemployed with respect to
being an employee is negatively related with the degree of social interactions (Graph
2.6). However, it is di¢ cult to assess which kind of relation exists between the obesity
wage premium and the degree of social interactions. If one assumes that Ireland can be
considered an outlier, then we get a negative relationship, which may be at odds with
the association regarding employment status. If, on the contrary, it is not assumed that
Ireland is an outlier, then a non-linear relationship cannot be discarded.
In general, some evidence is found on the role of culture on obesity labor market
outcomes: prevalence of obesity seems to be related to the social acceptance of obesity,
which may be translated to labor market outcomes for obese people. Nevertheless, any
conclusion taken from this whole analysis is limited by two main factors. First, although
the qualitative results can be useful to think more carefully on the role of cultural
factors and labor market institutions, we are only exploiting 7 to 9 pieces of available
information in order to capture country speci￿c factors, and hence the statistical rigor of
such an approach is null. Second, the scatter plots are drawn with many non-statistically
signi￿cant coe¢ cients.
5 Discussion
This article has examined the associations between obesity, employment status (employ-
ment, self-employment, and unemployment) and wages for several European countries.
Moreover, it has analyzed somewhat the role of culture and labor market institutions
on such associations.
18From this empirical analysis, four main results should be emphasized. First, there is
weak evidence that obese workers are more likely to be unemployed or tend to be more
segregated in self-employment jobs than their non-obese counterparts. Second, our
reported estimates also indicate it is extremely di¢ cult to detect statistically signi￿cant
associations between obesity and wages. Third, the associations tend to be di⁄erent
for men and women, particularly those regarding unemployment and wages. Fourth,
these same associations seem to be heterogeneous across countries and can be somewhat
explained by the role of some labor market institutions, such as collective bargaining
coverage and employer-provided health insurance.
Our paper complements previous studies analyzing the relationship between obesity
and labor market outcomes (wages in d￿ Hombres & Brunello, 2005; employment and
labor force participation in Sousa, 2005) using the ECHP, but in which the e⁄ect of
obesity on such outcomes is assumed to be the same across countries, only allowing
di⁄erences between Northern and Southern European countries. It also complements
the recent work by Lundborg et al. (2007) on the e⁄ect of obesity on occupational
attainment for people aged 50 and above in Europe. Moreover, our study illustrates
that, without restricting the relationship between obesity and labor market outcomes
to be equal across countries or groups of countries, the statistically signi￿cance of such
associations is low.
There are fruitful avenues for further research. First, studying the e⁄ect of obesity
on wages across countries within di⁄erent occupations (for example, white versus blue
collar workers) might show more statistically signi￿cant associations. Second, exploring
the e⁄ect of obesity on wages across countries in di⁄erent parts of the wage distribution
through Quantile regression might provide some new information, since wage ￿penalties￿
might be di⁄erent in di⁄erent parts of the wage distribution because the position of a
worker in the wage distribution re￿ ects characteristics of her job. We think that such
extensions can shed light on the relationship between obesity and wages across European
countries.
References
[1] Averett, S., and S. Korenman. 1996. The Economic Reality of the Beauty Myth.
Journal of Human Resources, 31: 304-330.
19[2] Baum II, C., and W. Ford. 2004. The Wage E⁄ects of Obesity: a longitudinal study.
Health Economics, 13: 885-899.
[3] Bhattacharya, J., and M. Kate Bundorf. 2005. The Incidence of the Healthcare
Costs of Obesity. NBER, Working Paper 11303.
[4] Behrman, J., and M. Rosenzweig. 2001. The Returns to Increasing Body Weight.
PIER, Working Paper 01-052.
[5] Blau, F., and L. Kahn. 1999. Institutions and Laws in the Labor Market, in O.
Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, North-
Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 1399-1461.
[6] Cawley, J. 2000. Body Weight and Women￿ s Labor Market Outcomes. NBER,
Working Paper 7841.
[7] Cawley, J. 2004. The Impact of Obesity on Wages. Journal of Human Resources,
39: 451-474.
[8] Cawley, J., M. Grabka, and D. Lillard. 2005. A Comparison of the Relationship
between Obesity and Earnings in the U.S. and Germany. Journal of Applied Social
Science Studies (Schmollers Jahrbuch), 125: 119-129.
[9] Cawley, J. 2007. The Labor Market Impacts of Obesity, in Obesity, Business, and
Public Policy, Z. Acs and A. Lyles (eds.). Northampton: Edward Elgar. In press.
[10] Conley, D., and R. Glauber. 2005. Gender, Body Mass and Economic Status.
NBER, Working Paper 11343.
[11] Conley, D., and R. Glauber. 2007. Gender, Body Mass, and Socioeconomic Status.
Advances in Health Economics and Health Services Research, vol. 17, The Eco-
nomics of Obesity, (K. Bolin and J. Cawley, eds.). Amsterdam: Elsevier. In press.
[12] Costa-Font, J., and J. Gil. 2004. Social Interactions and the Contemporaneous
Determinants of Individuals￿Weight. Applied Economics, 36: 2253-63.
[13] Deaton, A. 1997. The analysis of household surveys: a microeconometric approach
to development policy. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press for the World
Bank.
20[14] D￿ Hombres, B., and G. Brunello. 2005. Does Obesity Hurt Your Wages More in
Dublin than in Madrid? Evidence from the ECHP. IZA, Discussion Paper No.
1704.
[15] Greve, J. 2005. Obesity and Labor Market Outcomes: New Danish Evidence. Un-
published manuscript, Cornell University and Aahus School of Business, Denmark.
[16] Hamermesh, D., and J. Biddle. 1994. Beauty and the Labor Market. American
Economic Review, 84: 1174-1194.
[17] IOTF. 2002. Obesity in Europe. The case for action, International Obesity Task
Force and European Association for the Study of Obesity.
[18] IOTF. 2003. Obesity in Europe 2.Waiting for a green light for health? Europe at
the crossroads for diet and disease, International Obesity Task Force and European
Association for the Study of Obesity.
[19] Lundborg, P., K. Bolin, S. H￿jg￿rd, and B. Lindgren. 2007. Obesity and Occupa-
tional Attainment among the 50+ of Europe. Advances in Health Economics and
Health Services Research, vol. 17, The Economics of Obesity, (K. Bolin and J.
Cawley, eds.). Amsterdam: Elsevier. In press.
[20] Morland, K., S. Wing, A. Roux, and C. Poole. 2002. Neighborhood Characteristics
Associated with the Location of Food Stores and Food Service Places. American
Journal of Preventive Medicine, 22: 23-29.
[21] Morris, S. 2005. Body Mass Index and Occupational Attainment. Tanaka Business
School Discussion Papers: TBS/DP05/41.
[22] Morris, S. 2006. Body Mass Index and Occupational Attainment. Journal of Health
Economics, 25:347-364.
[23] OECD. 1997. OECD Employment Outlook 1997.
[24] OECD. 2004. OECD Employment Outlook 2004.
[25] PagÆn, J., and A. DÆvila. 1997. Obesity, occupational attainment, and earnings.
Social Science Quarterly, 78: 756-770.
21[26] Philipson, T. 2001. The World-Wide Growth in Obesity: an Economic Research
Agenda. Health Economics, 10: 1-7.
[27] Register, C., and D. Williams. 1980. Wage E⁄ects of Obesity among Young Workers.
Social Science Quarterly, 71:130- 41.
[28] Saporta, I., and J. Halpern. 2002. Being Di⁄erent Can Hurt: E⁄ects of Deviation
from Physical Norms on Lawyers￿Salaries. Industrial Relations, 41: 442-466.
[29] Sargent, J., and D. Blanch￿ ower. 1994. Obesity and Stature in Adolescence and
Earnings in Young Adulthood. Analysis of a British Birth Cohort. Archives of
Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine, 148: 681-687.
[30] Sarlio-Lahteenkorva, S., and E. Lahelma. 1999. The Association of Body Mass
Index with Social and Economic Disadvantage in Women and Men. International
Journal of Epidemiology, 28: 445-449.
[31] Sousa, S. 2005. Does size matter? A propensity score approach to the e⁄ect of
BMI on labour market outcomes. Unpublished manuscript, European University
Institute and University of Minho.
[32] Thomas, D., and E. Frankenberg. 2000. The Measurement and Interpretation of
Health in Social Surveys. RAND, Working Paper DRU-2550-NIA.
[33] WHO. 2002. The world health report 2002 - Reducing Risks, Promoting Healthy
Life.
[34] WHO. 2003. Diet, Nutrition, and the Prevention of Chronic Diseases. WHO Tech-
nical Report 916.
[35] Wooldridge, J. 2001. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cam-
bridge: MIT Press.
22APPENDIX         
          
Descriptive Statistics: AUSTRIA    Female      Male   
         
Variable  N Mean  Std.  Dev.    N Mean  Std.  Dev. 
         
Age  5,949 39.46  8.35    5,859 39.04  8.39 
Third Level Education (ISCED 5-7)  5,949 0.09  0.29    5,859 0.08  0.27 
Second Stage of Secondary Level Education (ISCED 3)  5,949  0.66  0.47    5,859  0.81  0.39 
Less than Second Stage of Secondary Education (ISCED 0-2)  5,949  0.25  0.43    5,859  0.11  0.32 
Body Mass Index  5,949  23.93  4.08    5,859  25.75  3.42 
Prevalence of obesity (BMI>= 30)  5,949  0.08  0.28    5,859  0.11  0.31 
Participation in the Labor Force  5,949 0.69  0.46    5,859 0.92  0.27 
Employee (working for an employer more than 15 hours/week)  4,263  0.79  0.41    5,601  0.81  0.40 
Self-Employed (working more than 15 hours/week)  4,263 0.16  0.37    5,601 0.15  0.36 
Unemployed  4,263 0.04  0.21    5,601 0.04  0.19 
Log (Hourly Wage)  1,978  4.50 0.38    3,093  4.72 0.35 
         
         
Descriptive Statistics: BELGIUM         
   Female      Male   
         
Variable  N Mean  Std.  Dev.    N Mean  Std.  Dev. 
         
Age  5,056 39.59  8.06    4,539 40.12  8.04 
Third Level Education (ISCED 5-7)  5,056 0.43  0.49    4,539 0.41  0.49 
Second Stage of Secondary Level Education (ISCED 3)  5,056  0.33  0.47    4,539  0.34  0.47 
Less than Second Stage of Secondary Education (ISCED 0-2)  5,056  0.24  0.43    4,539  0.25  0.43 
Body Mass Index  5,056  23.69  4.36    4,539  25.45  3.92 
Prevalence of obesity (BMI>= 30)  5,056  0.09  0.28    4,539  0.11  0.32 
Participation in the Labor Force  5,056 0.71  0.45    4,539 0.91  0.28 
Employee (working for an employer more than 15 hours/week)  4,033  0.79  0.41    4,344  0.81  0.39 
Self-Employed (working more than 15 hours/week)  4,033 0.09  0.29    4,344 0.14  0.34 
Unemployed  4,033 0.12  0.33    4,344 0.05  0.22 
Log (Hourly Wage)  903  5.72  0.29    1,211  5.81  0.32 
          
 
Descriptive Statistics: DENMARK         
   Female      Male   
         
Variable  N Mean  Std.  Dev.    N Mean  Std.  Dev. 
         
Age  4,460 39.17  8.54    4,495 39.41  8.46 
Third Level Education (ISCED 5-7)  4,460 0.34  0.47    4,495 0.31  0.46 
Second Stage of Secondary Level Education (ISCED 3)  4,460  0.52  0.50    4,495  0.55  0.50 
Less than Second Stage of Secondary Education (ISCED 0-2)  4,460  0.14  0.35    4,495  0.14  0.35 
Body Mass Index  4,460  23.99  4.09    4,495  25.34  3.48 
Prevalence of obesity (BMI>= 30)  4,460  0.09  0.28    4,495  0.09  0.29 
Participation in the Labor Force  4,460 0.82  0.38    4,495 0.90  0.29 
Employee (working for an employer more than 15 hours/week)  3,936  0.89  0.31    4,197  0.88  0.32 
Self-Employed (working more than 15 hours/week)  3,936 0.04  0.18    4,197 0.09  0.28 
Unemployed    3,936 0.07  0.26    4,197 0.03  0.18 
Log (Hourly Wage)  1,402  4.39 0.27    2,556  4.48 0.27 
         
         
Descriptive Statistics: FINLAND         
   Female      Male   
         
Variable  N Mean  Std.  Dev.    N Mean  Std.  Dev. 
         
Age  4,711 40.62  8.56    4,666 40.47  8.57 
Third Level Education (ISCED 5-7)  4,711 0.44  0.50    4,666 0.32  0.47 
Second Stage of Secondary Level Education (ISCED 3)  4,711  0.41  0.49    4,666  0.49  0.50 
Less than Second Stage of Secondary Education (ISCED 0-2)  4,711  0.16  0.36    4,666  0.19  0.39 
Body Mass Index  4,711  24.74  4.40    4,666  25.98  3.67 
Prevalence of obesity (BMI>= 30)  4,711  0.12  0.32    4,666  0.12  0.32 
Participation in the Labor Force  4,711 0.81  0.39    4,666 0.90  0.30 
Employee (working for an employer more than 15 hours/week)  4,118  0.81  0.39    4,443  0.74  0.44 
Self-Employed (working more than 15 hours/week)  4,118 0.11  0.32    4,443 0.21  0.41 
Unemployed  4,118 0.07  0.26    4,443 0.05  0.22 
Log (Hourly Wage)  1,487  3.79 0.30    2,238  3.93 0.33 
          
 
Descriptive Statistics: GREECE         
   Female      Male   
         
Variable  N Mean  Std.  Dev.    N Mean  Std.  Dev. 
         
Age  9,249 39.33  8.69    8,929 39.29  8.68 
Third Level Education (ISCED 5-7)  9,249 0.18  0.38    8,929 0.21  0.41 
Second Stage of Secondary Level Education (ISCED 3)  9,249  0.35  0.48    8,929  0.37  0.48 
Less than Second Stage of Secondary Education (ISCED 0-2)  9,249  0.47  0.50    8,929  0.42  0.49 
Body Mass Index  9,249  24.50  4.06    8,929  26.19  3.39 
Prevalence of obesity (BMI>= 30)  9,249  0.08  0.27    8,929  0.10  0.29 
Participation in the Labor Force  9,249 0.52  0.50    8,929 0.91  0.29 
Employee (working for an employer more than 15 hours/week)  5,359  0.56  0.50    8,535  0.54  0.50 
Self-Employed (working more than 15 hours/week)  5,359 0.33  0.47    8,535 0.41  0.49 
Unemployed  5,359 0.11  0.32    8,535 0.05  0.22 
Log (Hourly Wage)  1,595  7.06 0.37    2,692  7.25 0.40 
         
         
Descriptive Statistics: IRELAND         
    Female      Male   
         
Variable  N Mean  Std.  Dev.    N Mean  Std.  Dev. 
         
Age  5,055 39.40  8.65    4,841 39.50  8.64 
Third Level Education (ISCED 5-7)  5,055 0.20  0.40    4,841 0.20  0.40 
Second Stage of Secondary Level Education (ISCED 3)  5,055  0.41  0.49    4,841  0.38  0.48 
Less than Second Stage of Secondary Education (ISCED 0-2)  5,055  0.39  0.49    4,841  0.42  0.49 
Body Mass Index  5,055  24.39  4.14    4,841  25.98  3.42 
Prevalence of obesity (BMI>= 30)  5,055  0.09  0.29    4,841  0.10  0.30 
Participation in the Labor Force  5,055 0.57  0.50    4,841 0.88  0.33 
Employee (working for an employer more than 15 hours/week)  2,982  0.89  0.31    4,552  0.70  0.46 
Self-Employed (working more than 15 hours/week)  2,982 0.07  0.25    4,552 0.24  0.42 
Unemployed  2,982 0.04  0.20    4,552 0.07  0.25 
Log (Hourly Wage)  1,586  1.75 0.38    2,056  1.95 0.44 
          
 
Descriptive Statistics: ITALY         
    Female      Male   
         
Variable  N Mean  Std.  Dev.    N Mean  Std.  Dev. 
         
Age  15,937 38.61  8.72    15,708 38.43  8.66 
Third Level Education (ISCED 5-7)  15,937 0.12  0.32    15,708 0.11  0.32 
Second Stage of Secondary Level Education (ISCED 3)  15,937  0.43  0.50    15,708  0.42  0.49 
Less than Second Stage of Secondary Education (ISCED 0-2)  15,937  0.45  0.50    15,708  0.47  0.50 
Body Mass Index  15,937  23.13  3.69    15,708  25.27  3.33 
Prevalence of obesity (BMI>= 30)  15,937 0.05  0.22    15,708 0.07  0.26 
Participation in the Labor Force  15,937 0.51  0.50    15,708 0.85  0.36 
Employee (working for an employer more than 15 hours/week)  9,371  0.70  0.46    14,517  0.65  0.48 
Self-Employed (working more than 15 hours/week)  9,371  0.16 0.37    14,517  0.26 0.44 
Unemployed  9,371  0.14 0.35    14,517  0.09 0.28 
Log (Hourly Wage)  2,295  2.36 0.33    4,201  2.51 0.33 
         
         
Descriptive Statistics: PORTUGAL         
    Female      Male   
         
Variable  N Mean  Std.  Dev.    N Mean  Std.  Dev. 
         
Age  10,515 39.24  8.85    10,293 38.19  8.80 
Third Level Education (ISCED 5-7)  10,515 0.13  0.34    10,293 0.08  0.27 
Second Stage of Secondary Level Education (ISCED 3)  10,515  0.13  0.34    10,293  0.13  0.34 
Less than Second Stage of Secondary Education (ISCED 0-2)  10,515  0.74  0.44    10,293  0.78  0.41 
Body Mass Index  10,515  24.78  4.24    10,293  25.78  3.34 
Prevalence of obesity (BMI>= 30)  10,515 0.11  0.31    10,293 0.09  0.29 
Participation in the Labor Force  10,515 0.69  0.46    10,293 0.90  0.29 
Employee (working for an employer more than 15 hours/week)  7,743  0.76  0.43    9,603  0.74  0.44 
Self-Employed (working more than 15 hours/week)  7,743 0.18  0.38    9,603 0.23  0.42 
Unemployed  7,743 0.07  0.25    9,603 0.03  0.18 
Log (Hourly Wage)  3,630  6.2 0.48    5,381  6.43  0.43 
          
 
Descriptive Statistics: SPAIN         
    Female      Male   
         
Variable  N Mean  Std.  Dev.    N Mean  Std.  Dev. 
         
Age  12,110 38.20  8.66    11,890 38.08  8.52 
Third Level Education (ISCED 5-7)  12,110 0.28  0.45    11,890 0.27  0.44 
Second Stage of Secondary Level Education (ISCED 3)  12,110  0.19  0.39    11,890  0.21  0.41 
Less than Second Stage of Secondary Education (ISCED 0-2)  12,110  0.53  0.50    11,890  0.51  0.50 
Body Mass Index  12,110  23.96  4.13    11,890  26.11  3.71 
Prevalence of obesity (BMI>= 30)  12,110 0.09  0.28    11,890 0.13  0.34 
Participation in the Labor Force  12,110 0.50  0.50    11,890 0.86  0.35 
Employee (working for an employer more than 15 hours/week)  6,938  0.71  0.46    11,092  0.72  0.45 
Self-Employed (working more than 15 hours/week)  6,938  0.13 0.34    11,092  0.20 0.40 
Unemployed  6,938  0.16 0.37    11,092  0.09 0.28 
Log (Hourly Wage)  3,095  6.70 0.45    6,001  6.89 0.45 
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Figure 2. Cultural Factors and Obesity Labor Market Outcomes
   
Table 1A   Labor Market Status Equations  
  Multinomial Logit: Relative Risk Ratios for Body Size Measures 
  Dependent variable: [Prob. of Self-Employed / Prob. of Employee] 
         
   Female     Male   
  (1) (2) (3)    (1) (2) (3) 
 BMI  Weight
♣ Obese
♣♣   BMI  Weight
♣ Obese
♣♣ 
           
Austria 1.038 1.014 1.005    1.027 1.009 1.249 
  (.026) (.009) (.362)  (.027) (.008) (.360) 
           
Belgium  .983 .996 .876    .978 .995 .817 
  (.031) (.011) (.407)  (.024) (.008) (.250) 
           
Denmark  1.021 1.007 1.428   .979  .997  .608 
  (.051) (.018) (.856)  (.032) (.009) (.252) 
           
Finland 1.018 1.007 1.012    1.006 1.001  .912 
  (.021) (.008) (.343)  (.021) (.006) (.226) 








  (.016) (.006) (.362)  (.014) (.005) (.251) 








  (.032) (.012) (.906)  (.024) (.007) (.445) 
           
Italy 1.023  1.010  1.587
*  1.019  1.008
* 1.188 
  (.017) (.007) (.414)  (.012) (.004) (.178) 
           
Portugal  .981 .994 .979    1.045
* 1.017
* 1.584 
  (.023) (.009) (.289)  (.025) (.009) (.450) 
           
Spain 1.029  1.013




  (.019) (.007) (.306)  (.013) (.005) (.225) 
           
Pseudo-R
2  .12 .12 .12    .09 .09 .09 
N  48,743 48,743 48,743  66,884 66,884 66,884 
Note: All models include age, age squared, two educational dummies, standardized rest of household 
income in equivalent units, a dummy of married, the number of children under 14 in the household, 
the number of children between 14 and 15 in the household, country dummies, annual dummies, 
interaction between country and annual dummies, quarter of interview dummies, an indicator if the 
year of the interview differs from the panel wave and an indicator for face-to-face interview.  
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity (clustered at the individual level) are in parentheses. 
Observations have been weighted using the ECHP personal weights. 
♣ Height is also included. 
♣♣ Underweight and overweight categories are also included. 
* Significant at the 10 % level. 
* * Significant at the 5 % level. 
* * * Significant at the 1 % level. 
   
Table 1B   Labor Market Status Equations  
  Multinomial Logit: Relative Risk Ratios for Body Size Measures 
  Dependent variable: [Pr. of Unemployed/Pr. of Employee] 
         
   Female     Male   
  (1) (2) (3)    (1) (2) (3) 
 BMI  Weight
♣ Obese
♣♣   BMI  Weight
♣ Obese
♣♣ 
           
Austria 1.068
* 1.021 1.416  .992  .998  1.159 
  (.038) (.013) (.650)  (.040) (.013) (.407) 
           





  (.022) (.008) (.601)  (.033) (.010) (.947) 
           
Denmark  .993 .997 .928    1.008  1.001  2.011 
  (.029) (.010) (.331)  (.056) (.016) (1.185) 
           




  (.022) (.008) (.354)  (.031) (.010) (.195) 
           
Greece 1.041
* 1.015
* 1.336  .966  .981
* .959 
  (.024) (.009) (.390)  (.033)  (.0100) (.269) 
           
Ireland .992 .997 1.497    .921
** .971
** .609 
  (.052) (.020) (.779)  (.032) (.012) (.211) 




*   .981  .994  .956 
  (.017) (.006) (.508)  (.021) (.008) (.272) 
           
Portugal .995  1.000 1.242  .920
* .974  .582 
  (.035) (.014) (.503)  (.043) (.016) (.256) 




***   .957
** .985
** .922 
  (.016) (.006) (.355)  (.018) (.006) (.192) 
           
Pseudo-R
2  .12 .12 .12    .09 .09 .09 
N  48,743 48,743 48,743  66,884 66,884 66,884 
Note: All models include age, age squared, two educational dummies, standardized rest of household 
income in equivalent units, a dummy of married, the number of children under 14 in the household, 
the number of children between 14 and 15 in the household, country dummies, annual dummies, 
interaction between country and annual dummies, quarter of interview dummies, an indicator if the 
year of the interview differs from the panel wave and an indicator for face-to-face interview.  
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity (clustered at the individual level) are in parentheses. 
Observations have been weighted using the ECHP personal weights. 
♣ Height is also included. 
♣♣ Underweight and overweight categories are also included. 
* Significant at the 10 % level. 
* * Significant at the 5 % level. 
* * * Significant at the 1 % level. 
   
Table 2   Wage Equations 
  Ordinary Least Squares: Marginal Effects for Body Size Measures 
  Dependent variable: log(hourly wage) 
         
   Female     Male   
  (1) (2) (3)    (1) (2) (3) 
 BMI  Weight
♣ Obese
♣♣   BMI  Weight
♣ Obese
♣♣ 
           
Austria -.006
* -.002
* -.023  .003  .001  .047 
  (.003) (.001) (.042)  (.003) (.001) (.032) 
           




  (.003) (.001) (.043)  (.003) (.001) (.033) 




***   .002  .001  -.011 
  (.003) (.001) (.029)  (.003) (.001) (.031) 
           
Finland -.008
** -.002 -.099
**   .001  .000  -.010 
  (.004) (.001) (.043)  (.003) (.001) (.033) 
           
Greece -.004 -.002 -.084  .002  .001  .008 
  (.004) (.001) (.055)  (.003) (.001) (.037) 
           
Ireland -.001 .000 -.025    .007 .003
*  .069 
  (.003) (.001) (.047)  (.004) (.002) (.062) 
           
Italy  -.004 -.001 -.067   .000  .001  -.020 
  (.003) (.001) (.050)  (.002) (.001) (.028) 




*   .007  .003
* .042 
  (.002) (.001) (.044)  (.005) (.002) (.049) 
           
Spain -.006
* -.002 -.054  .001  .001  -.022 
  (.004) (.002) (.059)  (.003) (.001) (.032) 
           
N  17,971 17,971 17,971  29,429 29,429 29,429 
Note: All models include age, age squared, two educational dummies, experience, experience squared, 
tenure, country dummies, annual dummies, interaction between country and annual dummies, quarter 
of interview dummies, an indicator if the year of the interview differs from the panel wave and an 
indicator for face-to-face interview. 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity (clustered at the individual level) are in parentheses. 
Observations have been weighted using the ECHP personal weights.  
♣ Height is also included. 
♣♣ Underweight and overweight categories are also included. 
* Significant at the 10 % level. 
* * Significant at the 5 % level. 
* * * Significant at the 1 % level. 